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UCLA LAW REVIEW

When Courts Determine Fees in a System
With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials
to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants
Theodore Eisenberg
Talia Fisher
Issi Rosen-Zvi
Abstract
Under the English rule, the loser pays litigation costs whereas under the American rule,
each party pays its own costs. Israel instead vests in its judges full discretion to assess
fees and costs as the circumstances may require. Both the English and the American
rules have been the subjects of scholarly criticism. Because little empirical information
exists about how either rule functions in practice, an empirical study of judicial litigation
cost award practices should be of general interest. This Article presents such a study in
the context of Israel’s legal system. We report evidence that Israeli judges apply their
discretion to implement multiple de facto litigation cost systems: a one-way shifting
system that dominates in most tort cases; a loser pays system that operates when publicly
owned corporations litigate; and a loser pays system with discretion to deny litigation
costs in other cases. Although a loser pays norm dominates in Israel with litigation costs
awarded to the prevailing party in 80 percent of cases, Israeli judges still often exercised
their discretion to protect certain losing litigants, especially individuals, from having to
pay their adversaries’ litigation costs. In tort cases won by individual plaintiffs against
corporate defendants, for example, corporations had to pay their own litigation costs plus
plaintiffs’ litigation costs 99 percent of the time. Even when the corporate defendants
prevailed, they still had to pay their own litigation costs 52 percent of the time. When
public corporations litigated and lost, a loser pays system dominated. Award patterns
also varied by case category and judicial district. In property cases in one district, courts
denied prevailing plaintiffs fees in about 75 percent of cases. Theorizing about optimal
fee rules should account for the variety of fee outcomes observed in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
All legal systems encounter the fundamental issues of how to compensate
litigating attorneys and how to allocate other litigation expenses. Such compensation and expenses have received much recent scholarly attention.1 They have
even reached Europe’s highest courts, where litigants have prevailed on claims
that high court costs or the denial of legal aid violated fundamental rights under
European law.2 Litigation fees and expenses even provide a basis on which
countries compete for legal business.3
Commonly, discussions about litigation costs (fees plus costs)4 proceed as if
only two approaches existed to allocating these costs among litigating parties.
These two approaches are usually labeled the English rule and the American rule.5
In the state of Alaska and in most Western legal systems other than the United
States, the prevailing norm is the English rule, under which the losing party is
required to pay the reasonable litigation costs incurred by the winning party.6 The

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.

See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure: A Synthesis, in COST AND FEE
ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 3, 5–6 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012); Issachar Rosen-Zvi,
Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 731–34 (2010).
See Reimann, supra note 1, at 6–7.
For example, the German federal minister of justice competes for legal business by invoking the
predictability of Germany’s litigation cost system: “As court and lawyer’s fees are prescribed by law
and are always based on the value of the matter in dispute, legal costs can be calculated from the
outset.” SABINE LEUTHEUSSER-SCHNARRENBERGER, LAW—MADE IN GERMANY 29 (2012),
available at http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/Law-Made_in_Germany.pdf.
Although terminology can vary in the literature, this Article uses fees to refer to compensation paid
to litigating attorneys and costs to refer to filing fees and the like. In our analysis, we are usually
interested in the collective of fees plus costs, which we refer to as litigation costs. Practices with
respect to fees and costs are not always consistent within a country. See Reimann, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–29 (2013).
See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience With Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 37, 44–47; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on
Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms From Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125, 128 (2003).
For Alaska’s rule on fees, see ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82, which requires the losing party to pay a
percentage of the prevailing party’s fees. A loser pays provision is also found in section 5-111(e) of
the Uniform Commercial Code, pertaining to violations of obligations by issuers of letters of credit.
U.C.C. § 5-111(e) (2011). Nevada allows an award of fees to a prevailing party when the prevailing
party has not recovered more than $20,000. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.010(2)(a) (2008).
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American rule, on the other hand, ordinarily requires each party to bear its own
litigation costs regardless of the outcome of the case.7
Both systematic study of countries’ litigation cost practices and empirical
study of how private parties contract about litigation costs suggest the inadequacy
of the English rule–American rule dichotomy. Mathias Reimann, for example,
in summarizing a multicountry study of litigation cost practices, concluded that
“[p]erhaps the most fundamental finding of this study is that such a dichotomy is
hopelessly simplistic as well as virtually useless.”8 Even within the United States,
a study of litigation cost clauses in contracts revealed that many such clauses do
not fall neatly under either rule.9
Several practices blur the lines between methods of allocating litigation costs.
In many systems that nominally follow a loser pays principle, for example, the
losing party is only required to pay a statutorily or otherwise specified amount—
regardless of the prevailing party’s actual legal expenses—or only a percentage of
the litigation costs.10 England often shifts litigation costs less than countries with
such specified amounts or percentages.11 It and other British Commonwealth
countries regard a loser pays principle as “a general guideline, basic expectation,
and usual practice outcome.”12 But these countries grant some discretion to their

7.

8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–47 (1975). An exception
exists for vexatious litigation or litigation brought in bad faith, in which case the innocent party can
recover litigation costs from the party acting in bad faith. See, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S.
32, 45–46 (1991).
Reimann, supra note 1, at 9.
See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5, at 352 tbl.2. Some such contract clauses are even statutorily
validated in a number of American states, including, for example, by a California statute requiring a
party to pay its adversary’s fees if the party loses in litigation under a contract that specifies that the
party is to receive fees from its adversary if it prevails. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West 2009)
(“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs,
which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in
addition to other costs.”). Washington and Oregon have statutes similar to California’s. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 20.096 (2011) (stating that if a contract provides for fees to one party, the prevailing
party is entitled to fees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.330 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (stating
the same). New York has a statute to similar effect, but it is limited to landlord-tenant relations. See
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2006) (requiring a landlord to pay a tenant’s attorney’s
fees if a lease of residential property requires the tenant to pay the landlord’s attorney’s fees).
See Reimann, supra note 1, at 11 (reporting that a fixed cost schedule applies in Austria, Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, and Switzerland,
and that a percentage limitation applies in Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela).
See id. at 13.
Id.
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courts in allocating litigation costs, and judges often exercise their discretion to
require a prevailing party to “bear a considerable share of its own costs.”13
A plausible additional approach to allocating litigation costs is to vest full
responsibility for assessing them in the institutional actor with case-specific
expertise, with no affiliation with the litigating sides, and with a presumed
interest in promoting justice as each individual case requires—the judge. Such a
judge-centered system could, in theory, effectively address the problems associated with the litigation cost allocation methods already described. It might,
for example, avoid the systematic underpayment of litigation costs in countries
with fixed-amount or percentage-based reimbursement schedules since the judge
can adjust the amount awarded as each case warrants. A judge-centered system
might also avoid the harshness of litigating parties with reasonable but losing
claims having to bear the full litigation costs of their opponents. Israel and South
Africa have implemented such judge-centered allocation systems.14
Regardless of the strengths and weakness of a judge-based system, it is an
obvious candidate as an alternative to loser pays and neither party pays rules.
Interest in how a judge-centered system actually functions should transcend the
countries using it. Its functioning should interest countries concerned about
litigation costs and how they might be reduced, made more certain or more
flexible, or made fairer. Since litigation costs are a near-universal concern,15 this
Article’s empirical study of Israel’s experience with a judge-centered system
should therefore be of broad interest.
Litigation costs is such a vast topic that one article can only focus on a few
discrete questions. This Article reports our findings about when judges do not
impose litigation costs on a losing party—that is, when they deny an award to the
prevailing party—despite having the discretion to grant an award. The question
of when to relieve a losing party from having to pay its adversary’s litigation costs
is central to fee-shifting debates, which are usually framed in terms of a competition between only the English and American rules. In the United States, for
example, some have argued for a change towards the English rule on the theory

13.
14.

15.

Id.
See Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, It’s for the Judges to Decide: Allocation of Trial Costs in Israel Report
on Israel, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 177, 177–78;
Reimann, supra note 1, at 13. With respect to South Africa, see Ferreira v. Levin 1996 (2) SA 621
(CC) at 624 para. 3 (S. Afr.), which states that “the award of costs, unless expressly otherwise
enacted, is in the discretion of the presiding judicial officer and . . . the successful party should, as a
general rule, have his or her costs.”
See Reimann, supra note 1.
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that it more effectively deters the filing of frivolous lawsuits.16 Others, however,
fear that the English rule exacerbates the already significant financial barriers that
low- and middle-class individuals face in accessing the legal system.17
To summarize our findings, Israeli judges exercise their discretion in a
manner that often protects losing litigants, especially individuals. Overall, Israeli
judges denied litigation costs to prevailing defendants in 26.3 percent of cases
and to prevailing plaintiffs in 16.3 percent of cases. For individual plaintiffs and
defendants, denial rates exceeded one-third for defendants who prevailed against
individuals and exceeded one-quarter for plaintiffs who prevailed against individuals. Denials of litigation costs operated to protect individual plaintiffs against awards more than corporations. In cases lost by individual plaintiffs,
litigation costs were denied to successful defendants 29.9 percent of the time
compared to denials in 18.0 percent of cases lost by corporate plaintiffs and 16.7
percent of cases lost by governmental plaintiffs. In cases lost by individual
defendants, litigation costs were denied to successful plaintiffs 22.7 percent of the
time compared to 9.8 percent denials in cases lost by corporate defendants and
21.2 percent denials in cases lost by government defendants. Protection of
individuals was especially prevalent in tort cases between individual plaintiffs and
corporate defendants. In cases brought by individual plaintiffs, corporations had
to pay their own litigation costs plus plaintiffs’ 99 percent of the time. In such
cases won by the corporate defendants, they had to pay their own litigation costs
52 percent of the time. These general patterns, however, oversimplify a complex
litigation cost allocation system that varied by prevailing party (plaintiff vs.
defendant), party status (individual, government, corporation), case category (for
example, tort, property, or contract), and judicial district. Our findings suggest
that Israeli judges operate multiple de facto litigation cost systems: a one-way
shifting system that dominates in most tort cases; a loser pays system that
16.

17.

See, e.g., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 143, 145–46 (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (claiming that the house Republicans’ reform bill “penalizes
frivolous lawsuits by making the loser pick up the winner’s legal fees”); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991), reprinted in 60
U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 993–94, 1002–03 (1992) (proposing to revise the federal offer-of-judgment rule
to include the “additional costs of trial,” presumably including attorney’s fees, and recommending a
loser pays rule for discovery motions and for federal court diversity cases but calling for a moratorium
on one-way, plaintiff-favoring fee-shifting statutes); Op-Ed., Loser Pays, Everyone Wins, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703514904575602762974652860.html.
For a proposal to implement some form of a loser pays rule, see, for example, Attorney
Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2, proposing that a nonprevailing party must
pay the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees in federal civil diversity litigation in which an offer of
settlement has been made.
See, e.g., Rosen-Zvi, supra note 1, at 721–22.
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operates when publicly-owned corporations litigate; and a loser pays system with
discretion to deny litigation costs in all other cases. In one judicial district,
Nazareth, a system that requires each party to pay its own litigation costs prevailed
in most property cases.
It is important to track which party prevailed in trial court rulings because
rates of litigation cost denials are highly associated with whether plaintiffs or
defendants win. Tracking the prevailing party also allows us to present the first
major empirical summary of who prevails in litigation pursued to conclusion on
the merits in Israel’s district courts.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews relevant prior literature on litigation cost
allocation rules and also reports our expectations about what results should obtain
in Israel’s system. Part II provides necessary background information about
Israel’s legal system and its rules governing litigation costs. Part III describes our
study’s data and our research methodology. Part IV reports our results, which are
discussed in Part V. We then offer concluding thoughts.
I.

PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

Although a vast theoretical literature exists on litigation costs, much of it
need not be described here. The literature has been reviewed elsewhere and is of
limited relevance to this study because it reaches few consistent predictions or
prescriptions.18 Little, if any, prior literature focuses on outright denials of litigation costs—the topic of our inquiry. And no empirical literature exists on the
pattern of litigation cost denials in the mass of cases in a court of first instance.
Existing studies tend to examine litigation cost award amounts, not denials, in
specific subsets of cases—such as class action settlements19 or automobile accident cases.20 Class action litigation cost awards in the United States are
somewhat analogous to Israel’s allocation system in that the amounts of fee
awards to class counsel are left almost completely to the discretion of the district
judge.21 This judge-based corner of American class action law has produced a

18.
19.

20.
21.

See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements:
1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2010)];
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical
Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller (2004)].
See Paul Fenn & Neil Rickman, Fixing Lawyers’ Fees Ex Ante: A Case Study in Policy and Empirical
Legal Studies, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 533, 539 (2011).
See, e.g., Eisenberg & Miller (2010), supra note 19, at 249 (arguing that the judge is the only actor
who can protect the class’s interest in setting the fee).
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highly regular pattern of fee awards, in which the level of the award is largely
determined by the amount of the class recovery.22
Some literature reviewing actual litigation cost award practice provides
guidance about what judicial behavior to expect in Israel’s judge-centered system.
As noted above, Reimann’s review of dozens of legal systems found that many of
those systems were reluctant to apply loser pays rules fully.23 The perceived negative effect on potential low-income litigants seems to motivate the sentiment
against full shifting of litigation costs.24 Some theoretical law and economics analysis also suggests that limited litigation cost shifting, rather than full and unlimited reimbursement under a loser pays rule, may provide a superior litigation cost
allocation system.25
In response to such concerns about a firm loser pays rule, most English rule
jurisdictions temper their rule. In Australia it is estimated that despite a loser
pays rule, prevailing parties do not recover 40 to 50 percent of their litigation
costs;26 Belgium has a fixed reimbursement schedule but the amounts awarded to
prevailing parties are regarded as small;27 and Brazil has a low percentage cap on
recoverable litigation costs28 and exempts people who cannot afford the costs of
litigation from the loser pays rule altogether.29 Even Germany, the core jurisdiction that Reimann categorizes as a “major shifting” jurisdiction,30 limits
recovery of litigation costs to a statutorily prescribed amount.31 A winning party
that agreed to pay its attorney higher fees than specified in the statute cannot
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at 253–54 (showing a strong linear correlation between fee amount and class recovery
amount).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
A strict loser pays rule has been described, for example, as “a crude exclusion device the burden of
which falls disproportionately on individuals and community groups which do not have the same
deep pockets as governments and corporations.” Camille Cameron, The Price of Access to the Civil
Courts in Australia—Old Problems, New Solutions: A Commercial Litigation Funding Study, in COST
AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 59, 60 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
See Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The Hidden Virtues of the
Loser-Pays Rule 3 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144800.
Cameron, supra note 24, at 60.
See Ilse Samoy & Vincent Sagaert, “Everything Costs Its Own Cost, and One of Our Best Virtues Is a Just
Desire to Pay It.” An Analysis of Belgian Law, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 79, 83. For a fixed fee schedule in United Kingdom automobile
accident cases, see Fenn & Rickman, supra note 20, at 555.
See Alexandre Alcino de Barros & Sílvia Julio Bueno de Miranda, Major Shifting: The Brazilian Way,
in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 89, 92.
See id. at 94.
Reimann, supra note 1, at 10.
See Burkhard Hess & Rudolf Huebner, Cost and Fee Allocation in German Civil Procedure, in COST
AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1, at 151, 151.
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recover the excess from the losing party.32 The justification offered for this
limited recoverability is that it reduces “the financial risk of civil litigation and
thus protects the losing party.”33 Many other countries described in Riemann’s
volume on litigation cost allocation systems similarly limit the loser pays rule.34
Dissatisfaction with the default American rule in the United States has led
to many statutory mandates to shift litigation costs in certain types of cases.35 But
these statutes are often applied in such a way that litigation cost shifting occurs
only in favor of prevailing plaintiffs. For example, in 1980, Florida enacted a statute regulating medical malpractice litigation under which a losing party had to
pay the prevailing party’s litigation costs.36 The state’s medical association supported the statute based on the belief that litigation cost shifting would
discourage the pursuit of weak claims.37 The law, however, contained a provision
relieving insolvent parties of having to pay the prevailing party’s litigation costs,
leading some practitioners to view the rule as evolving into one-way shifting
scheme favoring plaintiffs.38 The Florida legislature repealed the statute five
years later, at the behest of the medical association that initially had sought its
passage.39
Evolution to one-way shifting also occurred under the main U.S. federal
fee-shifting statute applicable to civil rights cases, enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1976.40 The statute authorizes a litigation cost award to the
“prevailing party” in civil rights cases and thus does not expressly distinguish
between plaintiffs and defendants.41 In practice, however, it is difficult for
a prevailing defendant to recover litigation costs and the provision is regarded as

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
See COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Rozen-Zvi, supra note 1, at 721.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (repealed 1985).
See Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence
Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 355–56 (1990). The new statute notwithstanding,
however, the number of filed claims appeared to increase after passage of the shifting rule. Id. at 356.
See id.
See id. at 345, 355–56.
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006)).
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”). In 1991, Congress amended the
statute to permit the court, in its discretion, to allow expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113(a)(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1988(c)).
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a one-way shifting statute under which plaintiffs recover their litigation costs if
they prevail but need not pay the litigation costs of their adversaries if they lose.42
So although loser pays countries and the United States differ in their default
rules, most of either side’s forays into litigation cost shifting reflect a similar
sentiment: Full recovery is often regarded as unjust and as imposing too great a
risk of stifling justified litigation by persons of limited means. Consequently,
rules or judicial discretion often temper the negative effects of a pure loser pays
system.
If Israeli judges share the sentiments reflected in international practice, we
can expect them to use their discretion in allocating litigation costs to implement
differential treatment based on the losing party’s perceived ability to pay.
Although our data lack detailed financial information about individual litigants,
they do include litigants’ status as individuals, corporations, public corporations,
or governmental entities. We use this status as a proxy for ability to pay. We assume that, on average, corporations have a greater ability to pay than individuals
do and that public corporations have a greater ability to pay than other corporations do. We therefore expect the Israeli pattern of litigation cost awards to
protect individuals and nonpublic corporations over public corporations. The
government clearly has greater ability to pay than almost all other litigants do.
But it also differs from other litigants in its financial incentives and in its litigation
behavior.43 Therefore, we do not have a clear expectation about how judges will
treat the government in allocating litigation costs.
II.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT ISRAEL’S LEGAL SYSTEM

Comprehending this study requires some understanding of Israel’s relevant
institutional framework. Our focus in this Article is on litigation costs at the trial
court level in Israel’s district courts, and thus we limit the institutional description
of Israel’s court system in Part II.A to those aspects most relevant to this study.
In Part II.B, we then describe Israel’s rules on the allocation of litigation costs.

42.

43.

Cf. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 416–17, 421
(1978) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)) (stating that only
an unreasonable, frivolous, or groundless claim will support a fee award to a prevailing defendant in
Title VII cases and that a prevailing plaintiff will receive a fee award unless there are “special
circumstances [which] would render such an award unjust” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the Case
Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 94, 95 (2003).
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Israel’s Trial Court System44

Israel is a unitary state with a single system of courts of general jurisdiction. Other authorities also exercise subject matter or person-specific jurisdiction. Among the courts of general jurisdiction, Israel’s judiciary law establishes
a hierarchy of three levels with the Israel Supreme Court (ISC) at the top, district
courts below it, and magistrates’ courts at the bottom.45 District courts and
magistrates’ courts function as trial courts, while the Supreme Court functions
both as an appellate court and as High Court of Justice (HCJ).46 In its HCJ
capacity, the ISC operates as a court of first and last instance, primarily in areas
relating to government behavior.47
Twenty-nine magistrates’ courts operate as Israel’s basic trial courts and
serve the locality and district in which they sit. They have civil jurisdiction over
matters involving up to a specified monetary amount—currently 2.5 million
shekels (NIS) (approximately U.S. $675,000)—as well as over the use, possession, and division of real property. Magistrates’ courts also serve as traffic
courts, municipal courts, family courts, and small claims courts. Generally, a
single judge presides over each case unless the president of a specific magistrates’
court directs that a panel of three judges should hear a particular case.48
District courts have residual jurisdiction over matters not within the sole
jurisdiction of another court.49 There are six district courts, which sit in
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beer Sheva, Nazareth, and Petah-Tikva. The PetahTikva court was established in 2007.50 District courts have civil jurisdiction over
matters in which more than 2.5 million NIS are in dispute and commonly
adjudicate cases involving companies and partnerships, arbitration, and
prisoner petitions. They also hear appeals on tax matters and serve as administrative law courts. District courts also hear appeals from judgments of the magistrates’ courts.51 Generally, a single district court judge presides over trial. A
panel of three judges, however, hears appeals from magistrates’ court judgments

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Unless noted otherwise, this description of the Israeli judiciary is based on a similar description in
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court of Last
Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 246, 252–54 (2012).
See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) (Isr.).
See Menachem Hofnung & Keren Weinshall Margel, Judicial Setbacks, Material Gains: Terror
Litigation at the Israeli High Court of Justice, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 664, 669 (2010).
See id.
See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) ch. 2, art. 3, § 47 (Isr.).
See id. ch. 2, art. 2, § 40(2).
Ordinances of Courts (Establishment of the Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824.
See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984) ch. 2, art. 2, §
40(3) (Isr.).
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and sits when the president or deputy resident of a district court so directs.52 Our
data do not include any cases with a three-judge panel. This study is limited to
cases originating in the district courts.
Civil case filing fees are infrequently discussed as a significant part of
litigation costs in the United States because they tend to be relatively small.53 In
Israel, however, filing fees are much more substantial and, because they impose
higher ex ante costs, likely exert greater influence over the nature of cases filed in
court. Filing fees in the general civil courts for monetary claims are 2.5 percent of
the value of the relief sought, including a minimum fee that currently stands at
744 NIS. Any claim over 23,800,859 NIS (about $5.2 million), results in a filing
fee reduced to 1 percent of the claim amount.54 Thus, filing fees in monetary
damages cases can be several thousand dollars. Filing fees in cases involving
nonmonetary relief—such as suits for declaratory relief, contempt of court, or
derivative suits—as well as in personal injury suits are fixed by the Court Rules
(Court Fees) of 2007 and are updated from time to time.55 Several exceptions to
the requirement to pay filing fees exist depending either on a litigant’s financial
hardship or on the nature of the claim filed. For example, courts will exempt
plaintiffs in full or in part on a showing of financial inability to pay the fee.56 This
exemption applies narrowly, however, and an applicant for relief must
demonstrate not only inadequate personal financial resources but also the
unavailability of access to financial assistance from other sources (such as family
members).57 Exemptions from, or reductions of, filing fees based on the nature of
the claim filed include such cases as prisoner petitions and governmental takings,
as well as many others.58

52.
53.

54.
55.

56.
57.
58.

See id. ch. 2, art. 2.
For example, the filing fee to commence a civil action in federal court is $350. See 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) (2006). For a list of state court filing fees, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL
FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL COURTS, APRIL, 2012 (2012), available at http://www.ncsc.org/
information-and-resources/budget-resource-center/~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20and%20
Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/Civil%20Filing%20Fees%20April%202012.ashx.
Second Supplement of the Court Rules (Court Fees), 2007, sec. 8 (on file with author).
See id. sec. 2 (stating that the filing fee for bodily injury cases filed in magistrates’ court is currently
6592 NIS (about $1,780)); id. sec. 9 (stating that the filing fee for bodily injury cases filed in district
court is currently 41,203 NIS (about $11,125)); id. sec. 3 (stating that the filing fee for declaratory
relief cases filed in magistrates’ court is currently 633 NIS (about $171)); id. sec. 10 (stating that the
filing fee for declaratory relief cases filed in district court is currently 1115 NIS (about $301)).
Specialized courts and tribunals—such as family courts, labor courts, small claims courts, and the
like—are governed by special rules with respect to filing fees.
See id. sec. 14.
See SA 494/95 Shimoni v. Shimoni (unpublished, Mar. 23, 1995); TA (Tel Aviv) 511/98 Fuks v.
Discount Bank LTD (unpublished, June 9, 1999).
See Second Supplement of the Court Rules secs. 3, 9, 20.
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Israel’s Law on Litigation Costs

Israeli law governing litigation costs differs from almost all other legal
systems in the world (except South Africa and, to some extent, India)59 in that the
court has almost complete discretion over allocation decisions. The rules
regulating court costs and attorney’s fees (which are treated jointly)60 are specified
in the Rules of Civil Procedure from 1984 (RCP).61 The fundamental litigation
cost allocation rule—Rule 511—grants courts wide discretion with regards to
both the allocation of litigation costs and the amount awarded, and subjects this
discretion to only a limited set of guidelines prescribed in Rule 512.62
The RCP instruct courts to base their litigation cost rulings on, among other
things, the amount or value of the relief asked for by the plaintiff and the remedy
granted by the court. They also authorize the courts to take into consideration the
behavior of the parties during trial. Although, in practice, judges usually follow
the “loser pays rule,”63 the law does not mandate this and judges can—and
sometimes do—order winning parties to pay losing parties’ litigation costs.64 In
terms of the amounts awarded, some transformation has taken place over time.
Historically, courts tended to completely disregard the actual amounts expended
by winning parties, leading, in all likelihood, to undercompensation.65 In recent
years, however, following the “constitutional revolution,”66 which constitutionalized to a certain extent civil procedure, both those within and without the

59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Reimann, supra note 1, at 1.
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure treat court costs and attorney’s fees jointly using the term
“expenses,” the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) has urged judges to rule separately on court costs and
attorney’s fees, not the least because one must add a value-added tax (VAT) to attorney’s fees, which
should not be included in the amount payable as court costs. See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v.
Siat “Yesh Atid Biyalik,” 60(1) PD 391 [2005] (Isr.). It should be noted, however, that not all judges
follow the ISC’s recommendation. This Article’s outcome variable of primary interest is whether
litigation costs were denied. In such cases, the prevailing party received neither costs nor fees.
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1984, K.T. 5685, 2288 (Isr.).
Id.
URI GOREN, ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 2009).
See, e.g., CA (Jer) 35178-09-12 Morgenstern v. Drinking Bottles Collection Corp. (unpublished,
Feb. 11, 2013).
This is our impression of the prevalent supposition in the legal community.
See Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come
for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REV. 299, 310 (2003–2004) (“The enactment of
the 1992 basic laws [Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation] underlies the claim that Israeli has undergone a ‘constitutional revolution,’ transforming
it from a parliament-supremacy type democracy (similar to the UK) to a constitutional democracy
(like most other Western democracies) where human rights serve as powerful ‘trumps.’”).
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judicial system have increasingly argued that litigation costs awarded to winning
parties should be more in line with their actual litigation costs.67
In 2005, the ISC’s Registrar68 delivered a decision instructing judges to
award winning parties their actual litigation costs unless such an award would
unreasonably impair access to justice and equality or cause overdeterrence.69 In a
subsequent decision, the ISC explained that the intent of awarding the winning
party its actual litigation costs is to prevent financial loss by the winning party, to
deter potential plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims, and to discourage potential
defendants from defending against a rightful suit.70 The ISC, however, continued that this preference for awarding actual litigation costs is subject to the
incurred costs being “reasonable, proportional and necessary for the litigation.”71
This limitation is intended to avoid overdeterrence, to prevent inequality between
rich and poor parties, to inhibit inappropriate increases in the cost of litigation,
and to foster access to justice.72
Another recent ISC decision specified some of the factors judges should
consider when awarding litigation costs: the character of the suit and its complexity, the sought-after relief and the proportionality between it and the relief
actually granted, the amount of work invested by the award recipient on the litigation, the actual amount paid or payable as attorney’s fees, and the behavior of
the requesting party during the litigation.73
Notwithstanding these decisions, it is clear to those acquainted with Israeli
civil litigation that, in the majority of the cases, the awarded litigation costs do not
reflect the actual costs expended during the litigation. This is in part because
courts do not know what the parties’ actual litigation costs were. Parties requesting an award of litigation costs are not required to, and rarely do, introduce
into evidence the actual costs and fees they had to expend on the litigation.74
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

SHLOMO LEVIN, THE THEORY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: INTRODUCTION AND BASIC
PRINCIPLES (2008).
The ISC Registrar is a magistrate court judge who sits at the ISC and handles certain procedural
issues, such as requests for filing fees exemptions, petitions to join parties, and questions of appellate
jurisdiction.
See HC 891/05 Tnuva v. The Authority for the Licensing of Imports (unpublished, June 30, 2005).
See RCA 6793/08 Luar v. Meshulam Levinshtein Handasa Vekablanut (unpublished, June 28, 2009).
Id.
See id.
See CA 9535/04 Siat “Biyalik 10” v. Siat “Yesh Atid Biyalik,” 60(1) P.D. 391 [2005] (Isr.).
In 2002, the ISC’s president, Justice Aharon Barak, issued administrative guidance regarding the
award of attorney’s fees. According to the guidance, judges, when calculating attorney’s fees, are
allowed to take into account the written retainer agreement between the party and her attorney that
was introduced into evidence by the attorney during trial or as an annex to the written summations.
The second part of the guidance qualifies this instruction by stating that attorneys are not obligated
to introduce retainer agreements into evidence and that courts are not obligated to take them into
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In summary, the RCP and other guidance provided to Israeli judges embody considerations similar to those in theoretical discussions of optimal litigation cost allocation rules. Avoiding financial loss to prevailing parties, deterring
frivolous litigation, promoting defendant reasonableness, promoting fair access
to the justice system, avoiding overdeterrence, and making awards correspond to
effort expended all appear in such theoretical discussions as well.75 To the extent
that Israeli judges strive to accommodate these multiple considerations, their
behavior supplies evidence of how a more finely tuned litigation cost allocation
system might function.
III.
A.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Data and Methodology

We use an original data set gathered for this study. The data consist of civil
cases filed under the original jurisdiction of the five district courts that existed in
Israel in 2005 and 2006. Because our topic is the award of litigation costs, we
included only civil cases that reached final decisions on the merits. The study includes every case decided in 2005 or 2006 for which an opinion was available
online via the Dinim website.76 Dinim is a private company that furnishes attorneys and other paying clients with access to case information. Using the
Dinim database led us to focus our inquiry on 2005 and 2006 in the first instance
because these are the first two years for which the database is supposedly comprehensive regarding district court decisions.77 Prior to those years, we could not be
sure that the selection of cases by the people who operate Dinim did not generate
selection bias. Under Israeli law prevailing in the study years, parties in civil pro-

75.
76.
77.

account when calculating. See SUP. CT. ISR., ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SUPREME COURT 1/98, CALCULATING ATTORNEY FEES (2002). Justice Barak’s
successor, President Justice Dorit Beynish, issued in 2010 an amendment to the administrative
guidance proclaiming that, “as a general rule, the attorney fees to be awarded should approximate
the actual costs expended on the litigation, subject to their being reasonable, proportional and
necessary under the circumstances. In this regard, each party is allowed to introduce . . . the written
retainer agreement between that party and her attorney, as well as proof of any money paid as
attorney fees.” SUP. CT. ISR., GUIDELINES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(2010), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/dover/html/hanchayot_new.pdf. The second part of
the Barak administrative guidance remained in place, however. See id. Conversations we held with
numerous attorneys and judges suggest that, in practice, parties rarely introduce retainer agreements into evidence.
See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, Indemnity of Legal Fees, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 63, 64–65 (Boudewijn Bouckaert
& Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
DINIM, http://www.dinimveod.co.il/Default.aspx (last visited May 14, 2013).
Telephone Conversation with Michal Vinograd, Gen. Manager of Dinim (June 2011).
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ceedings were permitted to file interlocutory appeals from every decision made by
the court during trial.78 We dropped such interlocutory appeals from the study.
Our final sample consists of 1140 cases.
We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the Dinim database by
comparing it with data obtained from Israel’s official court system website, Net
Hamishpat.79 Although Net Hamishpat does not provide information relating
to all district courts operating during 2005 and 2006, the partial data that it does
provide suggest that the data obtained from the Dinim website are indeed
comprehensive and accurate. The data thus provide a complete picture of district
court civil case activity in the periods covered and a sound basis for assessing how
the courts rule with respect to litigation costs in civil cases.
The data are subject to some limitations. First, the study covers only final
decisions in civil matters, thus omitting cases terminated in a different manner—
via settlement, dismissal, or judgment by way of settlement under section 79A of
the Courts’ Law.80 Second, the study excludes interlocutory decisions. Third, the
study relates to the district court level only, excluding the magistrates’ courts and
the ISC. Fourth, the study covers only civil courts of general jurisdiction, thereby
excluding specialized courts such as family courts, rabbinical courts, labor courts,
and military courts. Fifth, since the study covers only a limited period, trends
over time cannot be assessed. We thus examine only a small doctrinally important slice of a broader universe of court activity.
Student research assistants coded cases, which a second group of more
experienced students randomly sampled for accuracy. Prior to the student coding,
the authors designed a data form to structure the coding. The performance of the
form and the students was reviewed in an initial set of cases, the form was revised
in light of that experience, and a final form was constructed. The students used
that revised form to code the cases, under the supervision of the authors. Because
of the importance of case categories in understanding litigation outcomes,81 we
coded cases into nine civil case categories based on the first claim listed in the
petition. Table 1 shows the number of the 1140 cases in each case category,
further subdivided by the districts that finally decided the cases.
Most case categories involve the kinds of cases one would expect in any legal
system, but some require additional explanation in light of distinctive Israeli law.
78.
79.
80.
81.

In 2009, the Minister of Justice issued a decree limiting the scope of such interlocutory appeals under the
authority granted to him by a 2008 amendment to the 1984 Courts Act. See Courts Decree (Types of
Decisions on Which No Interlocutory Appeal Would Be Granted) (2009) (on file with authors).
NET HAMISHPAT, http://www.hamishpat.co.il (last visited May 14, 2013).
See Courts Act § 79 A (Isr.).
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1138 (1992) (“Case categories are of central importance.”).
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Since 2000, most cases that deal with administrative law are under the
jurisdiction of either Israel’s specialized administrative courts or the ISC in its
HCJ capacity. Our sample does not include cases from either of these courts.
Regular civil courts, including district courts, have residual administrative law jurisdiction and deal mostly with restitution claims in administrative matters.
These claims are a small minority of cases on the administrative docket and only
eight of them are in our sample. With respect to arbitration cases, the Arbitration
Act of 1968 allows parties to arbitration to resort to court during the arbitration
process or following its conclusion. During the arbitration, the court has the
power to intervene in various procedural aspects of the arbitration.82 But the most
significant and prevalent jurisdiction of courts is to invalidate a final arbitration
decision for reasons specified in the Act.83 Expropriation cases involve government condemnation of property.
About 80 percent of the case sample consists of three major civil case
categories which we coded as Contract, Property, and Tort. Substantial
interdistrict variety existed in the distribution of case categories. Contract cases
dominated in Tel Aviv, Tort cases in Haifa and Jerusalem, and Property cases in
Nazareth. Cases were most evenly distributed across the major case categories in
Beer Sheva.

82.
83.

See Arbitration Law, 5728-1968, ch. 2 (Isr.).
See id. § 24 (Isr.) (listing ten bases for setting aside or modifying an arbitration award).
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TABLE 1. Distribution of Sample Cases by Case Category and District
Beer Sheva

Jerusalem

Nazareth

Tel Aviv

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

N

%

3

3.9

4

1.1

3

1.8

0

0.0

12

2.8

22

1.9

Arbitration

11

14.5

39

10.3

1

0.6

0

0.0

3

0.7

54

4.7

Banking

1

1.3

9

2.4

2

1.2

1

1.1

14

3.2

27

2.4

Contract

14

18.4

53

14.0

42

25.3

19

21.3

166

38.5

294

25.8

2

2.6

9

2.4

2

1.2

2

2.2

13

3.0

28

2.5

Expropriation

3

3.9

2

0.5

2

1.2

6

6.7

7

1.6

20

1.8

Property

19

25.0

76

20.1

43

25.9

48

53.9

78

18.1

264

23.2

Tort

21

27.6

160

42.3

64

38.6

6

6.7

109

25.3

360

31.6

Other

2

2.6

26

6.9

7

4.2

7

7.9

29

6.7

71

6.2

Total

76

100

378

100

166

100

89

100

431

100

1140

100

Administrative
Law

Corporations
Law

Haifa

Total

Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.

B.

Descriptive Statistics

In addition to the district and case category variables described in Table 1,
two other variables play a central role in our analysis: which party prevailed and
the status of the parties as plaintiffs or defendants.
Parties who lose generally cannot expect to be awarded litigation costs and
parties who win have some expectation of recovering such costs. It is therefore
critical to track which party prevailed in a case. Of the 1140 case outcomes, plaintiffs prevailed fully in 320 cases, prevailed in part in 353 cases (by, for example, not
recovering the full amount requested), and were denied relief in 467 cases. For

1470

60 UCLA L. REV. 1452 (2013)

purposes of our analysis, we treat plaintiffs who prevailed in part as having won,
though we also report whether this decision influences key results.84
Table 2 reports the prevailing party for nine combinations of plaintiff and
defendant party status. Party status throughout this Article is based on the first
named plaintiff or defendant in each case and is divided into the three categories:
Individual, Corporation, and Government. We did not distinguish among the
various government entities that litigated.
TABLE 2. Prevailing Party by Plaintiff-Defendant
Party Status Combination
Plaintiff-Defendant
Combination

Defendant Won

Plaintiff Won

N

%

N

%

Total

Individual v.
Individual

118

35.0

219

65.0

337

Individual v.
Corporation

125

37.0

213

63.0

338

Individual v.
Government

89

63.1

52

36.9

141

Corporation v.
Individual

23

39.7

35

60.3

58

Corporation v.
Corporation

66

39.5

101

60.5

167

Corporation v.
Government

28

45.9

33

54.1

61

Government v.
Individual

9

47.4

10

52.6

19

Government v.
Corporation

7

50.0

7

50.0

14

Government v.
Government

2

40.0

3

60.0

5

Total

467

41.0

673

59.0

1140

Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.

84.

For a discussion on the ambiguities in defining case outcomes, see, for example, Theodore Eisenberg
& Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 676
(1987), which argues that formally successful actions might be de facto failures and formal losses may
indirectly achieve desired goals.
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Table 2 shows substantial variation in win rates for the plaintiff-defendant
party status combinations. Individuals suing governmental entities were the least
successful plaintiff-defendant combination with a substantial number of cases;
plaintiffs prevailing in 36.9 percent of cases compared to an overall plaintiff success rate of 59.0 percent. This is the only combination in which plaintiffs prevailed at less than a 50 percent rate. Individuals suing other individuals and
corporations suing individuals or other corporations all prevailed in 60.3 percent
to 65.0 percent of cases. Table 2’s win rates provide a baseline for the expected
rate of litigation cost awards to various types of parties if Israel’s judges always follow the loser pays rule.
The varying win rates across plaintiff-defendant party status combinations,
combined with the known importance of case categories, suggests that understanding the relation between these factors is critical to understanding litigation cost
award patterns. For example, an individual plaintiff suing a corporate defendant
in tort may generate a different reaction from a judge awarding litigation costs
than a corporate plaintiff suing a corporate defendant in contract.
Table 3 reports the number of cases in each case category for each plaintiffdefendant party status combination. Government plaintiff cases are not shown,
both in the interest of space and because there were too few such cases to reasonably subdivide across case categories. The first row for each case category
shows the number of cases for each plaintiff-defendant combination. The second row for each case category shows the column percentage for the particular
combination. For example, the first entry in the first row shows that there was one
Administrative Law case in which an individual sued another individual. The
corresponding entry in the second row shows that this one case comprised 0.30
percent of all cases involving suits by individuals against individuals.
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TABLE 3. Distribution of Cases by Case Categories and PlaintiffDefendant Party Status Combination
Individual Plaintiffs
Category
Administrative
Law
Arbitration
Banking
Contract
Corporations
Law
Expropriation
Property
Tort
Other
Total

Ind.
Def.

Corp.
Def.

Govt.
Def.

Corporate Plaintiffs
Ind.
Def.

Corp.
Def.

Govt.
Def.

Total

1

0

9

0

0

10

20

0.30

0.00

6.38

0.00

0.00

16.39

1.81

11

10

2

6

12

4

45

3.26

2.96

1.42

10.34

7.19

6.56

4.08

0

9

0

7

10

0

26

0.00

2.66

0.00

12.07

5.99

0.00

2.36

71

62

10

22

88

31

284

21.07

18.34

7.09

37.93

52.69

50.82

25.77

5

16

0

4

3

0

28

1.48

4.73

0.00

6.90

1.80

0.00

2.54

0

1

16

0

1

0

18

0.00

0.30

11.35

0.00

0.60

0.00

1.63

126

56

40

7

24

5

258

37.39

16.57

28.37

12.07

14.37

8.20

23.41

104

170

55

8

18

5

360

30.86

50.30

39.01

13.79

10.78

8.20

32.67

19

14

9

4

11

6

63

5.64

4.14

6.38

6.90

6.59

9.84

5.72

337

338

141

58

167

61

1102

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Note: This table excludes thirty-eight cases in which governmental entities were plaintiffs.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.

Table 3 shows that Property cases constituted a substantially higher
proportion of individual plaintiff cases than of corporate plaintiff cases. Property
cases comprised 37 percent of cases filed by individuals against other individuals,
17 percent of cases filed by individuals against corporations, and 28 percent of
cases filed by individuals against governmental entities. When corporations were
plaintiffs, the percentage of Property cases was lower regardless of the party status
of the defendant. Tort cases were most prominent in suits by individuals against
corporations or governmental entities. For example, Tort cases comprised more than
half of all actions filed by individuals against corporations. But Tort actions comprised
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only a small fraction of cases filed by corporate plaintiffs. Contract actions were the
most prevalent case category for corporate plaintiffs. Contract actions also constituted the highest percentage of all cases, regardless of defendant status, and accounted for more than half of all actions against corporate and government
defendants.
IV.

RESULTS

Assessing judicial behavior with respect to litigation cost awards requires a
measure of that behavior. More than one award outcome is of potential interest.
The amount of the award is of obvious importance, as is the relation of that
amount to other factors, such as the amount at stake in a given case or the size of
the recovery. But the question whether any litigation costs are awarded is logically
antecedent to the amount of the award and that amount’s relation to other factors.
The basic dividing line between litigation cost award systems, however blurred
that line may be in actual practice, is whether the prevailing party has a right to
recover its litigation costs. We therefore employed whether litigation costs were
denied to the prevailing party as our outcome measure and termed this outcome
variable “litigation cost denial.” We coded this variable as “1” when a judge awarded the prevailing party no litigation costs and as “0” when a judge awarded any
litigation cost amount. We excluded forty cases from our analysis because they
contained no information on whether litigation costs had been awarded. If perceptions about Israeli judges as generally applying a loser pays rule are correct,
denials of litigation costs should be rare.
We first investigate the relations between our outcome variable “litigation
cost denial” and explanatory variables of primary interest: plaintiff-defendant party
status combination, case category, and judicial district. We then report the results
of regression models that simultaneously account for the relations between denials
and multiple explanatory variables.
A.

Bivariate Results

Table 4 shows the denial rate for litigation costs as a function of case
category and as a function of whether plaintiff or defendant prevailed. In cases
won by defendants, the highest rates of litigation cost denials occurred in the
categories of Tort, Administrative Law, and Expropriation. Prevailing defendants were denied litigation costs in 42 percent of Tort cases, 33 percent of Administrative Law cases, and 29 percent of Expropriation cases. By contrast, prevailing plaintiffs were never denied litigation costs in Expropriation cases and
were rarely denied litigation costs in Tort cases. The highest rate of litigation cost
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denials for prevailing plaintiffs was a 36 percent denial rate in Property cases, a
rate that substantially exceeded the denial rates in the two other large case categories of Tort and Contract. Overall, prevailing defendants were denied litigation
costs at noticeably higher rates than prevailing plaintiffs, though substantial
variation across case categories counsels against putting too much weight on
these aggregate figures. The significance levels in Table 4’s last row report the
results of tests of the hypothesis that litigation cost denial rates are independent of
case category. The reported significance levels, which are less than p=0.001 for
cases won by both plaintiffs and defendants, support rejecting the hypothesis of
independence. Thus, statistically significant variation in denial rates exists
across case categories for cases won by both plaintiffs and defendants.
TABLE 4. Litigation Cost Denial Rates by Case Category
and Prevailing Party
Case category

Defendant Won

Plaintiff Won

Total

Administrative Law (n=22)

0.33

0.30

0.32

Arbitration (n=52)

0.04

0.33

0.19

Banking (n=26)

0.00

0.20

0.12

Contract (n=293)

0.28

0.15

0.21

Corporations Law (n=28)

0.25

0.25

0.25

Expropriation (n=17)

0.29

0.00

0.12

Property (n=254)

0.21

0.36

0.29

Tort (n=359)

0.42

0.04

0.16

Other (n=71)

0.09

0.16

0.13

Total (n=1122)

0.26

0.16

0.20

Significance

p<0.001

p<0.001

Note: Reported significance levels account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and terminated in 2005–06.

Within the Tort category, automobile accident cases were by far the most
numerous, comprising about 42 percent of the category.85 They also showed
slightly lower litigation cost denial rates for prevailing plaintiffs than other Tort
85.

By comparison, in the United States in 2005, automobile accident cases constituted nearly 60 percent
of state court tort trials. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228129, CIVIL
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS: TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS,
2005, at 1 (2009). In our data, professional malpractice cases accounted for 16.7 percent of terminated
Israeli tort cases. In the United States in 2005, medical malpractice cases comprised 15 percent of
state court tort trials, and other professional malpractice cases comprised about 1 percent of such
trials. Id. at 1–2.
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cases. The 4 percent rate of denials in cases in which plaintiffs prevailed consists
of a 6.9 percent denial rate in 116 nonautomobile Tort cases and a 1.5 percent
denial rate in 134 automobile accident cases, a difference significant at p=0.046.
In Tort cases in which defendants prevailed, the 42 percent litigation cost denial
rate consists of a 40.9 percent denial rate in ninety-three nonautomobile cases
and a 50 percent denial rate in sixteen automobile cases, a difference which is not
statistically significant (p=0.587).
Table 4’s results are largely insensitive to whether plaintiffs prevailed in whole
or in part. Overall, prevailing plaintiffs were denied litigation costs in 14.4 percent
of cases in which their claims were accepted in whole, compared to 18.1 percent of
cases in which their claims were accepted in part. These low rates of denials persist
in Tort and Expropriation cases regardless of whether plaintiffs’ claims were accepted in whole or in part. High rates of denials persist in those two case categories
in cases won by defendants, regardless of whether defendants prevailed in whole or
in part. The one exception to this general pattern occurs in Contract cases won by
plaintiffs. In Contract cases in which plaintiffs’ claims were accepted in whole,
litigation costs were denied to prevailing plaintiffs in only 6.9 percent of fifty-eight
cases. In Contract cases in which plaintiffs’ claims were only accepted in part,
litigation costs were denied to prevailing plaintiffs in 19.4 percent of 103 cases.
Table 4 shows frequent litigation cost denials in some case categories and a
natural question is what prompts judges to depart from the loser pays norm. Illustrative fact patterns can supply contextual background about denial rates. We therefore describe litigation cost denials that occurred in a Tort case and an Expropriation
case—two classes of cases with high denial rates when defendants prevailed.
Shuki Tal v. Migdal Insurance LTD86 was a Tort case in which the plaintiff
was involved in a car accident that caused him extensive bodily injuries. The
plaintiff filed a suit based on the Road Accident Victim Compensation Law of
1976 against his insurance company arguing that the accident had severely
harmed his functional abilities and rendered him unable to work.87 The suit was
filed only days before the expiration of the statute of limitations period on the
cause of action.88 At first, the defendant insurance companies did not deny liability. But two years into the trial they changed course and argued that at the
time of the accident the plaintiff was not covered by his insurance policy because
his driver’s license had been disqualified and was thus invalid. The central issues
to be decided were (1) whether the plaintiff had a valid driver’s license at the time

86.
87.
88.

CC (TA) 1214/96 (unpublished, Nov. 5, 2006).
See id. para. 1.
See id. para. 3.
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of the accident; (2) if he did not, whether he was aware that his driver’s license
was invalid; and (3) if he was, whether a court decision annulling the driver’s
license disqualification would apply retroactively. The court concluded that the
plaintiff’s driver’s license had been invalid at the time of the accident, that he was
aware of this fact, and that the annulment of the disqualification did not apply
retroactively.89 The court therefore ruled in favor of the defendants. In light of
the circumstances and the conduct of the parties during the litigation, however,
the court decided that each party would bear its own costs.90
Heirs of the Late Ahmad Mustafa Abed v. State of Israel 91 was an Expropriation
case involving government condemnation of the plaintiffs’ property in Nazareth.
The plaintiffs were the sole heirs of the late Ahmad Mustafa Abed, who had been
the prior owner of the property.92 Upon his death, the plaintiffs inherited the
property, but the state expropriated the property in 1976.93 The dispute revolved
around the compensation amount the government should pay. The appraiser appointed by the state set the value of the property significantly lower than the value
ascribed to it by the plaintiffs’ appraiser.94 The court accepted the state’s appraisal,
but it denied the government its litigation costs in light of the fact that the state had
updated its appraisal prior to the commencement of the legal proceeding.95
Table 5 shows the rate at which litigation costs were denied as a function of
plaintiff-defendant party status combination and prevailing party. The lowest rate
of denials for a combination with a substantial number of cases occurred in cases in
which individual plaintiffs prevailed against corporations; litigation costs were
denied in only 8 percent of such cases. When individual or governmental
defendants prevailed in actions brought by governmental plaintiffs, courts never
denied litigation costs. The small numbers of such cases, however, counsel against
putting too much emphasis on this result.
The highest rate of litigation cost denials for a combination with a substantial
number of cases was the 37 percent denial rate in cases won by the government as
defendant against individual plaintiffs. When defendants prevailed, the three
highest rates of denials for party status combinations with substantial numbers of
cases all involved individual plaintiffs. This suggests that courts were more protective of individual plaintiffs who brought unsuccessful cases than of corporate
plaintiffs who lost. Consolidating the nine possible party status combinations into
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. para. 4–6.
See id.
CC (Nazareth) 1127/04 (unpublished, Apr. 2, 2006).
See id. para. 2.
See id. para. 3.
See id. para. 7.
See id. para. 13.
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three combinations based on the individual, corporate, or governmental status of
the plaintiff—regardless of the party status of the defendant—resulted in a
statistically significant difference in denial rates based on the party status of the
plaintiff in cases in which defendants prevailed, but not in cases in which plaintiffs
prevailed. This suggests that the greater protection provided to losing individual
plaintiffs through higher litigation cost denial rates was unlikely to occur by chance.
TABLE 5. Rate of Litigation Cost Denial, by Plaintiff-Defendant Party
Status Combination and Prevailing Party
Plaintiff-Defendant
Combination

Defendant
Won

Plaintiff
Won

Total

Individual v. Individual
(n=333)

0.31

0.24

0.27

Individual v.
Corporation (n=337)

0.24

0.08

0.14

Individual v.
Government (n=131)

0.37

0.20

0.31

Corporation v.
Individual (n=58)

0.09

0.17

0.14

Corporation v.
Corporation (n=164)

0.23

0.13

0.17

Corporation v.
Government (n=61)

0.14

0.18

0.16

Government v.
Individual (n=19)

0.00

0.10

0.05

Government v.
Corporation (n=14)

0.43

0.29

0.36

Government v.
Government (n=5)

0.00

0.67

0.40

Total (n=1122)

0.26

0.16

0.20

Significance
(9 Combinations)

p=0.052

p=0.016

Significance
(3 Plaintiff Categories)

p=0.025

p=0.551

Note: Reported significance levels account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge. The
significance level reported for three plaintiff categories is based on plaintiffs as individuals, corporations, or the
government without regard to defendant status.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.
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Table 5’s results are largely insensitive to whether one distinguishes between
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed in whole or in part. Substantial differences in
denial rates, however, emerged for some plaintiff-defendant combinations. In
cases in which individual plaintiffs prevailed against the government and
plaintiffs’ claims were accepted in whole, for example, litigation costs were denied
in 9 percent of cases (2 of 22). When individual plaintiffs’ claims were accepted
in part, on the other hand, litigation costs were denied in 29.6 percent of cases (8
of 27), a difference that is marginally statistically significant at p=0.072.96 In cases
in which corporate plaintiffs succeeded in whole against corporate defendants,
litigation costs were denied in only 2 percent of cases (1 of 47). In cases in which
corporate plaintiffs succeeded in part against corporate defendants, however,
litigation costs were denied in 23.5 percent of cases (12 of 51), a difference
statistically significant at p=0.001.
Table 6 shows the rate at which litigation costs were denied as a function of
judicial district and prevailing party. The most striking result is the 56 percent
denial rate in cases won by plaintiffs in Nazareth. We defer further analysis of the
Nazareth district to Part V.
TABLE 6. Rate of Litigation Cost Denial by Judicial District
and Prevailing Party
Judicial District
Beer Sheva (n=67)
Haifa (n=376)
Jerusalem (n=165)
Nazareth (n=85)
Tel Aviv (n=429)
Total (n=1122)
Significance

Defendant
Won
0.38
0.24
0.30
0.29
0.24
0.26
p=0.628

Plaintiff
Won
0.15
0.13
0.10
0.56
0.13
0.16
p<0.001

Total
0.27
0.17
0.19
0.46
0.18
0.20

Note: The significance levels account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same judge.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.

Table 6’s results for Tel Aviv differed for cases in which plaintiffs prevailed
in whole or in part. In cases in which plaintiffs prevailed in whole, litigation costs

96.

Significance levels reported in the text account for the nonindependence of decisions by the same
judge.

Fee Denials to Winning Parties

1479

were denied in 7.6 percent of cases (8 of 105). When plaintiffs’ claims were
accepted in part, litigation costs were denied in 17.7 percent of cases (23 of 130),
a difference marginally significant at p=0.067.
B.

Regression Analysis

Because multiple factors of interest may be associated with litigation cost denials, regression analysis is useful in assessing the degree to which Part IV.A’s
bivariate results persist when explanatory factors are taken into account simultaneously. Since the outcome variable “litigation cost denial” is dichotomous, we employ logistic regression.97
Table 5 suggested that plaintiff-defendant status combinations are
significantly associated with litigation cost denial rates, at least when defendants
prevail. It is therefore important to include plaintiff-defendant party status
combinations as explanatory variables in our regression models. Further, Tables
4–6 suggest that whether plaintiff or defendant prevailed can be important in
assessing whether litigation costs were denied. To isolate the effect of plaintiffdefendant party status while also accounting for prevailing party, we modeled litigation cost denials separately for cases in which plaintiffs prevailed and cases in
which defendants prevailed.98 Table 7 confirms the propriety of creating such separate models, as it shows that covariates often differ in size and significance based
on the prevailing party. Tables 2 and 5 showed that the government was the
plaintiff in few cases. For purposes of our regression models, we therefore combined the government plaintiff categories into a single category of government as
plaintiff without distinguishing among defendants by party status.
With respect to individuals as defendants, we initially conducted a separate
analysis that coded for the presence of a family as a group of defendants. Fiftyone cases involved such a family group defendant, and forty-nine of these cases
had information about the prevailing party. About 70 percent of the family
group cases involved Property or Contract claims, and 49 percent were comprised
of Property claims. Plaintiffs won 63 percent of these cases (31 of 49) but
litigation costs were denied in 48.4 percent of them. This litigation cost denial

97.
98.

See generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, MICROECONOMETRICS USING
STATA 459 (rev. ed. 2010) (discussing logistic regression).
An alternative approach would be to construct variables that measure the interaction between the
party status variables (that is, the plaintiff-defendant party status combinations) and the prevailing
party variable. Interacting the nine plaintiff-defendant party status combinations with the two
prevailing party values would lead to eighteen possible plaintiff-defendant/prevailing-partyinteraction dummy variables. We explored these models, but they were less than satisfactory in
terms of fitting the data and resulted in multicollinearity problems.
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rate is far higher than the 14.7 percent denial rate in cases won by plaintiffs that
did not involve a family group as defendants. We therefore initially included a
family-group-defendant dummy variable in our models. This variable turned out
to be statistically insignificant, however, likely due to its overlap with the Property
case category and was therefore dropped from our models.
We also included additional explanatory variables to account for the factors
that Part IV.A or Israel’s legal rules governing litigation costs suggest may matter
in judges’ litigation cost allocation decisions. Table 4, for example, showed the
importance of case categories and Table 6 showed the importance of judicial
districts, so we included dummy variables for each of these factors. Furthermore,
since RCP Rule 512 instructs courts to base their litigation cost rulings in part on
the amount or value of the relief requested and the remedy granted by the court,
we also included variables for whether a plaintiff prevailed in whole or in part and
for whether nonmonetary relief was granted in the models of cases won by
plaintiffs. The sample contains decisions by ninety-eight different district court
judges and we clustered the standard errors by the identity of the judge to account
for the nonindependence of decisions rendered by the same judge.
Table 7 reports the regression results. Models (1) and (3) include only cases
won by plaintiffs and models (2) and (4) include only cases won by defendants.
Due to the small number of cases in some case categories, we added Administrative Law cases, Banking cases, and Corporations Law cases to the residual
category of cases, “Other.” The table reports the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome variable. The marginal effects are interpretable as
the change in the probability of a litigation cost denial given a one-unit change in
an explanatory variable. For categorical explanatory variables, this change in probability is in comparison to a reference category—that is, a value of the explanatory
variable against which changes in the outcome probability are measured. The
reference category for the plaintiff-defendant/prevailing-party combinations, for
example, is Individual vs. Individual. This means that the coefficients for the
other plaintiff-defendant/prevailing-party combinations in Table 7 indicate how
much more or less likely a litigation cost denial becomes as compared to the
baseline case of a suit between two individuals. Jerusalem is the reference category
for judicial district in all four models. In models (1) and (2), Tort is the reference
category for case categories.
Because Table 4 showed that Tort cases are distinctive, we also constructed
models limited to non-Tort cases to assess whether the large group of Tort cases
drives our results using the full sample. In models (3) and (4), which exclude Tort
cases, the reference case category is the residual category Other. We ran similar
models with variables for the gender and ethnicity of plaintiffs and defendants, as
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well as for cases in which one party was represented by counsel while the other
was not.99 None of these variables was statistically significant and we therefore do
not report these models’ results.
TABLE 7. Logistic Regression Models of Litigation Cost Denials
(1)
Cases
Plaintiffs Won

(2)
Cases
Defendants Won

(3)
Non-Tort Cases
Plaintiffs Won

(4)
Non-Tort Cases
Defendants Won

Claim Fully

-0.130***

-

-0.233***

-

Accepted

(0.024)

-

(0.044)

-

Nonmonetary

0.087**

0.036

0.129***

0.017

Relief

(0.037)

(0.066)

(0.048)

(0.059)

Individual v.

-0.061*

-0.070

-0.069

-0.102**

Corporation

(0.031)

(0.044)

(0.056)

(0.049)

Individual v.

0.042

0.006

0.109

-0.033

Government

(0.055)

(0.067)

(0.107)

(0.059)

Corporation v.

-0.039

-0.177***

-0.089

-0.115*

Individual

(0.042)

(0.050)

(0.075)

(0.062)

Corporation v.

-0.042

-0.081

-0.067

-0.020

Corporation

(0.032)

(0.057)

(0.068)

(0.057)

Corporation v.

-0.033

-0.137**

-0.051

-0.114*

Government

(0.036)

(0.066)

(0.069)

(0.066)

Government

-0.012

-0.075

-0.009

-0.052

Plaintiff

(0.047)

(0.069)

(0.091)

(0.065)

Beer Sheva
Haifa
Nazareth
Tel Aviv
Arbitration

99.

0.057

0.116

0.140

0.226

(0.073)

(0.128)

(0.126)

(0.149)

0.017

-0.074

0.032

0.035

(0.043)

(0.071)

(0.079)

(0.089)

0.379***

-0.016

0.497***

0.096

(0.126)

(0.093)

(0.143)

(0.126)

0.035

-0.053

0.068

0.028

(0.047)

(0.074)

(0.081)

(0.092)

0.352**

-0.248***

0.070

-0.171***

(0.142)

(0.033)

(0.084)

(0.049)

Nonrepresentation almost uniformly consisted of plaintiffs having counsel and defendants not having counsel. It was most prevalent in Nazareth, which included twenty of the thirty-eight pro se
defendant cases, nineteen of which were Property cases.
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(1)
Cases
Plaintiffs Won

(2)
Cases
Defendants Won

(3)
Non-Tort Cases
Plaintiffs Won

(4)
Non-Tort Cases
Defendants Won

0.125**

-0.101*

-0.092

0.120*

(0.061)

(0.057)

(0.069)

(0.066)

0.252**

-0.193***

-

-

(0.116)

(0.046)

-

-

0.246***

-0.192***

0.020

0.027

(0.073)

(0.045)

(0.074)

(0.062)

-

-0.117

-

0.112

-

(0.095)

-

(0.193)

17.6%

5.8%

16.3%

4.0%

0.243

0.086

0.180

0.068

652

460

402

351

Proportionate
Reduction in
Error
Pseudo
R-Squared
Observations

Note: The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable for which 1 represents a litigation cost denial.
The proportionate reduction in error compares the models’ predicted outcomes to the rate of error using
the modal outcome (no denial of litigation costs) as the prediction in each case. Standard errors,
clustered by judge, are in parentheses. * indicates p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.

The coefficient on “Claim Fully Accepted” in model (1) indicates that full
acceptance of a plaintiff’s claim, in contrast to partial acceptance or denial of the
claim, is strongly, negatively, and statistically significantly associated with a court
not ordering payment of litigation costs. Full acceptance of a claim decreases the
probability of a litigation cost denial by 13 percent. When the sample is limited
to non-Tort cases in model (3), this effect is even stronger with a 23.3 percent
decrease in the probability of a litigation cost denial upon full acceptance of a
plaintiff’s claim. This result can be interpreted as showing that judges implement
RCP Rule 512’s instruction to consider the degree to which a prevailing party
succeeded on its claims. The size and statistical significance of the “Nonmonetary
Relief” variable coefficient in models (1) and (3) also suggests that judges take
seriously RCP Rule 512’s instruction to take account of the nature of the relief
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granted when deciding on whether to award the prevailing party its litigation
costs.100 We next describe the case category, party status, and district results.
1. Case Categories
Table 4 showed high litigation cost denial rates in Tort and Expropriation
cases won by defendants, low denial rates in Banking cases won by defendants,
and low denial rates in Tort and Expropriation cases won by plaintiffs. Models
(1) and (2) confirm that these results persist when one accounts for other
explanatory factors.
In model (1), the coefficients for all case category dummy variables are
positive, indicating a higher probability of litigation cost denials when plaintiffs
win non-Tort cases than when they win Tort cases. These coefficients are all
statistically significant. Winning Tort plaintiffs tend to be awarded litigation
costs more frequently than plaintiffs who prevail on non-Tort claims. Expropriation cases were excluded from model (1) because there was no variation in the
variable: As shown in Table 4, litigation costs were never denied in such cases.
When plaintiffs lost Tort cases, on the other hand, they tended not to be
assessed their adversary’s litigation costs. In model (2), all case category coefficients
other than Expropriation are substantial and negative, and all coefficients except
Expropriation are either statistically significant or marginally statistically significant.
The results for Arbitration cases won by plaintiffs are striking. Model (1)
shows that prevailing Arbitration plaintiffs were 35.2 percent more likely to be
denied litigation costs than prevailing plaintiffs in Tort cases. Denial rates in Arbitration cases in model (1) also significantly differed from denial rates in Contract
cases (p=0.042). In model (2), denial rates in Arbitration cases significantly
differed only from those in Tort cases, and the intercategory variation outside of
Tort cases was generally lower than in model (1). In model (3), Arbitration cases
had the highest rates of litigation cost denials when plaintiffs won, and the
difference between denial rates in Arbitration cases and Contract cases was
statistically significant (p=0.031). Model (4) shows that, excluding Tort cases
from the analysis, Contract cases had the highest rates of litigation cost denials
when defendants won—denial rates were 12 percent higher than in the Other
reference category. Contract denial rates in model (4) only marginally signifi100. 53 percent of nonmonetary relief cases won by plaintiffs were Property cases. Nonmonetary relief

dominated the Arbitration (28 of 29 cases won by plaintiffs) and Property (124 of 146 cases won
by plaintiffs) case categories. This helps explain the prominence of the nonmonetary relief node
in Figure 1, infra.
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cantly differed from denial rates in Property cases (p=0.074). Litigation cost
denial rates in Expropriation cases were similar to those in Contract cases, but the
Expropriation category had so few cases that this result merits little emphasis.
2. Plaintiff-Defendant Combinations
Table 5 suggested high rates of litigation cost denials when individual
plaintiffs prevailed against individual defendants. That five of the six plaintiffdefendant combination coefficients in model (1) are negative—indicating that
litigation cost denials were less likely in such cases than in the reference category
of Individual v. Individual—is consistent with this, as is one of the coefficients
differing marginally statistically significantly from the reference category. The
positive sign on the coefficient for Individual v. Government is the one exception
to this pattern, but this coefficient is not close to being statistically significant. In
general, the coefficients for the plaintiff-defendant combination variables were
modest in model (1). The range of their observed effect was only about a 10
percent difference in the probability of a litigation cost denial compared to a case
between two individuals. The denial rate for individual plaintiffs prevailing
against corporate defendants, however, was significantly lower than the denial
rate for individual plaintiffs prevailing against the government (p=0.017).
Prevailing government plaintiffs were less likely to be denied litigation costs than
individuals who prevailed against other individuals, but this result was not
statistically significant. These results are reasonably consistent with Table 5’s
report of the bivariate relation between litigation cost denial and party status.
In model (2)’s regression of litigation cost denials for prevailing defendants,
some larger effects emerge. The negative sign on five of the six plaintiffdefendant combination coefficients suggests that winning defendants were likely
to be denied litigation costs when they were individuals who prevailed against
individual plaintiffs. This denial effect is substantial, and highly statistically
significant, when compared to both the 13.7 percent lower probability of a
litigation cost denial when government defendants prevailed against corporate
plaintiffs and the 17.7 percent lower probability of a denial when corporate
defendants prevailed against individual plaintiffs. The only coefficient for a
plaintiff-defendant combination with a positive sign, Individual v. Government,
was near zero and far from statistically significant. These results are reasonably
consistent with Table 5’s bivariate results. As Table 5 also suggested, the large and
negative sizes of the coefficients for cases lost by corporate plaintiffs indicate that
judges are reluctant to deny litigation costs when corporate plaintiffs lose. As
Table 5 also suggested, when defendants prevailed the three highest rates of liti-
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gation cost denials all involved individual plaintiffs—the reference category of Individual v. Individual, Individual v. Corporation, and Individual v. Government.
Together, these results suggest that judges tended to protect losing individual
plaintiffs against litigation cost awards.
When one excludes Tort cases in model (3), the results for the plaintiffdefendant combinations do not change dramatically but vary in size. As in model
(1), five of the six party status coefficients are negative, suggesting that judges
were relatively more likely to deny litigation costs in cases in which individuals
prevailed against individuals. The coefficients tend to be larger negative numbers
in model (3) than in model (1), suggesting a stronger denial effect for individual
plaintiffs who prevailed against individual defendants in non-Tort cases.
Model (4), which analyzes non-Tort cases in which defendants prevailed,
shows a negative sign on all of the party status coefficients, again suggesting that
prevailing defendants were most likely to be denied litigation costs when they
were individuals who prevailed against individual plaintiffs. Three of the party
status coefficients significantly differed or marginally significantly differed from
the reference category. The coefficients for the individual plaintiff categories in
model (4) show a less clear pattern of protecting individuals than those in model
(2). This suggests that judges are especially likely to protect individuals in Tort
cases.
3. Districts
Both models of cases with prevailing plaintiffs (models (1) and (3)) suggest
that the Nazareth district court was more willing to deny litigation costs in such
cases than other district courts. This confirms the results of Table 6, which
showed a 56 percent overall rate of litigation cost denials in Nazareth in cases
won by plaintiffs—a rate far higher than in other districts. Table 6 also showed a
different pattern of litigation cost denials in cases won by defendants. In such
cases, Beer Sheva judges were the most likely to deny litigation costs. Regression
models (models (2) and (4)) also support this result.
After controlling for other factors, model (1) shows that in cases in which
plaintiffs prevailed, Nazareth judges were 37.9 percent more likely to deny
litigation costs than the reference category of Jerusalem judges. Model (3) shows
that this difference increases to 49.7 percent in non-Tort cases. Both differences
are highly statistically significant. In model (1), moreover, Nazareth judges not
only differed significantly from Jerusalem judges but also differed significantly
from Haifa judges (p<0.001), from Tel Aviv judges (p<0.001), and from Beer
Sheva judges (p=0.003). In model (3), without Tort cases, Nazareth judges again
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significantly differed from Jerusalem judges, Haifa judges (p<0.001), Tel Aviv
judges (p<0.001), and Beer Sheva judges (p=0.020).
The district level pattern of litigation cost denials changes dramatically in
cases won by defendants. Models (2) and (4) show that the Nazareth–Jerusalem
difference is much smaller, pointing in inconsistent and statistically insignificant
directions in these cases. In model (2), the only significant or near-significant
differences were between Beer Sheva and Tel Aviv judges (p=0.075) and between
Beer Sheva and Haifa judges (p=0.048). In model (4), Beer Sheva judges differed
significantly from Tel Aviv judges (p=0.047), and differed marginally from Haifa
judges (p=0.053). Thus, although Nazareth judges were the most protective of
losing defendants, Beer Sheva judges seem to be most protective of losing
plaintiffs.
As a check on our regression results, we constructed a classification and
regression tree (CART). CART analysis helps explore how decisions branch at
what are believed to be relevant nodes in the analysis (that is, at the explanatory
variables).101 Each node in a decision tree is split into two groups, and the data
are then partitioned into those groups to process the data farther down the tree.
This binary partitioning process is repeated, with child nodes generating their own
subnodes. A CART is a useful check on results obtained by logistic regression
because it is nonparametric and therefore does not depend on assumptions underlying regression models.
Figure 1 presents a CART for our data. Although space constraints prevent
presenting a CART that includes all of our variables, Figure 1 confirms our
evidence of strong associations between litigation cost102 denials (node 0) and the
explanatory variables locale, prevailing party, and case category. The Nazareth
variable is the highest node in the classification tree, suggesting that influences on
litigation cost denials are strongly associated with locale. In the Nazareth
subgroup of cases, denials are likely further associated with the Property case
category. For non-Nazareth cases, the next highest node is the prevailing party
variable (nodes 3 and 4). This result supports modeling cases won by plaintiffs
separately from cases won by defendants. For the 429 non-Nazareth cases won
by defendants, the Tort case category is the next node (nodes 7 and 8), with large
differences in litigation cost denials between its two branches. This supports
examining models that exclude Tort cases. Overall, then, this nonparametric

101. See generally LEO BREIMAN ET AL., CLASSIFICATION AND REGRESSION TREES (1984);

Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules With Classification
Trees, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 202 (2010).
102. In Figure 1’s nodes, the term fees is used to represent litigation costs to conserve space.
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CART analysis confirms the associations detected in the bivariate and regression
analyses and provides a reasonable visualization of the data.
Figure 1. Classification and Regression Tree for Litigation Cost Denial

V.

DISCUSSION

Our results suggest a hierarchy in which Israeli judges are most protective of
individual litigants and least protective of large corporations. The greater protection of individuals is substantially attributable to Tort cases. The regression
models are generally consistent with the raw rates of litigation cost denials by
party status and with the bivariate results presented in Tables 4 to 6.
In addition to this individual protection theme, the data suggest that Israel’s
judges operate at least three different de facto litigation cost allocation subsystems, depending on the nature of the case and the status of the parties. We find
evidence of subsystems dominated by one-way shifting, by a loser pays rule, and
by a mixed system of loser pays with discretion to deny litigation costs. We even
find a pocket of cases in one district where the American rule prevailed for one
kind of case.
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One-Way Shifting Dominates in Tort

In Tort cases, Israel’s district court judges produced results that are about as
close to a one-way shifting system for litigation costs as they are to a loser pays
system. Table 4 shows that 42 percent of successful Tort defendants did not
recover their litigation costs, whereas 96 percent of successful plaintiffs recovered
theirs. This pattern overwhelmingly favors individual plaintiffs; Table 3 shows
that individual plaintiffs brought 92 percent of tort actions.
Deeper analysis of litigation cost denial patterns in Tort cases offers insights
into the possible effects of granting the U.S. corporate tort reform movement’s wish
for the implementation of a loser pays litigation cost allocation system. Table 8 shows
the pattern of litigation cost denials by plaintiff-defendant party status combinations in Tort cases. Corporations would likely be most concerned about cases in
which individuals sued them because that is the most frequent plaintiff-defendant
combination in Tort cases. In cases won by individual plaintiffs, corporations had
to pay their own litigation costs plus plaintiffs’ litigation costs 99 percent of the
time. In cases won by defendants, on the other hand, prevailing corporations still
had to pay their own litigation costs 52 percent of the time. When weighting these
percentages by the frequency of plaintiff wins (139 cases) and defendant wins (31
cases), corporate defendants paid their own litigation costs in 90 percent of the 170
Tort cases in which individual plaintiffs sued corporate defendants. The individual
plaintiffs, on the other hand, paid their own litigation costs in only 10 percent of
cases. These results are much closer to one-way shifting than to a loser pays system.
These results are not a reflection of Israeli judges tending to deny all victorious
Tort defendants their litigation costs. When corporate defendants prevailed in Tort
cases against corporate plaintiffs, litigation costs were rarely denied, though that
plaintiff-defendant combination was infrequent.
If, therefore, the United States adopted a loser pays rule, gave judges
discretion to deny litigation costs, and American judges behaved similarly to Israeli
judges, corporations might not only have to pay their own litigation costs in the
vast majority of cases but also often have to pay the plaintiffs’ litigation costs. Under the current American rule, by contrast, they only have to pay their own litigation costs—win or lose. As Stephen Yeazell intimated in commenting on the
effects of discovery reform, be careful what you wish for.103 Florida’s aborted ex-

103. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked for, Getting What We Paid for, and Not Liking What We

Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 945 (2004) (“Having got what we
asked for and what we paid for, we are now soberly assessing the results.”).

Fee Denials to Winning Parties

1489

periment with a loser pays rule in medical malpractice cases104 reinforces the implications of the Israeli experience.
TABLE 8. Rate of Litigation Cost Denials in Tort Cases by Plaintiff-Defendant
Party Status Combination and Prevailing Party
Individual v.
Individual (n=103)
Individual v.
Corporation (n=170)
Individual v.
Government (n=55)
Corporation v.
Individual (n=8)
Corporation v.
Corporation (n=18)
Corporation v.
Government (n=5)
Total (n=359)

Defendant won

Plaintiff won

Total

0.43

0.07

0.16

0.52

0.01

0.11

0.50

0.05

0.35

0.00

0.25

0.13

0.08

0.00

0.06

0.33

0.00

0.20

0.42

0.04

0.16

Source: Dinim database of Israeli civil district court cases that were adjudicated on the merits and
terminated in 2005–06.

A similar pattern emerges from the much smaller class of Expropriation
cases, most of which involve individuals suing the government. In the eight cases
won by individual plaintiffs against the government, litigation costs were never denied. In the five cases won by the government against individual plaintiffs, litigation costs were denied in two cases. These results again suggest protection for
individuals.
B.

Loser Pays Dominates for Public Corporations

Evidence of a loser pays norm was most prominent in cases involving public
corporations. Within the corporate party category, we coded for whether a corporate plaintiff or defendant was a public corporation. We expect such corporations to have more assets, on average, than other parties, which may influence
judges’ litigation cost rulings. One-hundred-thirty cases, or 11.4 percent of the
sample, involved public corporate defendants, and forty-four cases, or 3.9 percent
104. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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of the sample, involved public corporate plaintiffs. Of the 130 cases with public
corporate defendants, plaintiffs prevailed in seventy-six cases and had their litigation costs denied in 7.9 percent of them. Similarly, judges denied litigation costs
in only one of the fourteen cases (7.1 percent) that involved public corporate
plaintiffs that lost to a prevailing defendant. The near-uniform treatment of
public corporations precludes efforts to identify factors (such as case category or district) that may influence the treatment of such corporations. Little variation exists
in the outcome of interest, litigation cost denials, which could be explained using
other factors present in the cases. Despite our resulting inability to include public
corporate status as an explanatory variable in our regression models, our models
reflect some of the treatment of these corporations. This is because variables
representing corporate status, without further distinguishing between public and
private status, remained in the models and public corporations represent a
significant number of the parties characterized as corporations.
Further examination of public corporation cases shows how close the Israeli
litigation cost allocation system operated as a nearly uniform loser pays system as
applied when such corporations lost. Of the 130 cases in which public corporations were defendants, 98 percent had only two plaintiff-defendant patterns: Either the public corporation sued another corporation or an individual sued the
public corporation. Judges denied litigation costs in only 6.5 percent of cases (4 of
62) in which an individual plaintiff succeeded against a public corporation.
Similarly, judges awarded litigation costs to successful corporate plaintiffs in 83
percent of cases (10 of 12) in which they prevailed against a public corporation
defendant. By contrast, judges denied litigation costs in one-quarter of the cases
(9 of 36) in which a public corporation prevailed against an individual plaintiff.
Judges also denied litigation costs in 24 percent of the cases (4 of 17) in which a
public corporation defendant prevailed against a corporate plaintiff. Of the fortythree cases for which we have data on public corporations as plaintiffs, judges denied litigation costs in 7 percent of the cases (1 of 14) in which the public
corporation lost and in 10 percent of the cases (3 of 29) in which the public corporation plaintiff prevailed.
C.

Mixed System

In cases not involving Tort, Expropriation, or public corporations, Israel operates a system in which litigation costs are awarded approximately equally in cases
won by plaintiffs and defendants. Of the remaining 641 cases, 349 were won by
plaintiffs with litigation costs being denied in 25.8 percent of them. In the 292
cases won by defendants, litigation costs were denied in 22.3 percent of the cases.
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Thus, a soft loser pays rule dominated but with substantial rates of departure for
both plaintiffs and defendants.
D. District Effects
The data also show that the treatment of litigation costs varied depending
on the district that heard the case. This might be in part because the case category
mix varied by district. As Table 1 showed, Property cases dominated Nazareth’s
docket. They comprised more than 50 percent of Nazareth’s cases, while they
did not account for more than half of that share in any other district. Nazareth’s
high overall litigation cost denial rate derived from its 72.7 percent denial rate in
Property cases won by plaintiffs, a rate nearly triple that of any other district.
These cases were mostly litigated between individual plaintiffs and individual
defendants. In Nazareth Property cases, Israeli judges come closest to the
American rule of each party bearing its own costs.
E.

Party Status Hierarchy

Against the background of the importance of case categories and other
factors such as court locale, a party status hierarchy emerges. Israeli judges were
least protective of public corporations, which almost always had to pay litigation
costs both as losing defendants and as losing plaintiffs. They were most
protective of individual litigants, who often did not have to pay their adversaries’
litigation costs as losing plaintiffs, and were rarely denied their litigation costs as
winning plaintiffs in the large category of Tort cases.
Evidence of protection of individual litigants also exists in the two other
large case categories of Contract and Property. In results not reported in the
tables above, we examined the pattern of litigation cost denials by case category
and plaintiff-defendant combination. Courts once again protected individuals, as
litigation costs were denied in 37.1 percent of Contract cases lost by individual
plaintiffs against individual defendants, in 20 percent of Contract cases lost by
individual plaintiffs against corporate defendants, and in 50 percent of Contract
cases lost by individual plaintiffs against government defendants. Litigation cost
denial patterns in Property cases do not provide as much useful information
about party status because such cases overwhelmingly involved individual
litigants. Individuals were plaintiffs in 84.1 percent of all Property cases and
defendants in an additional 4.5 percent of cases. Litigation cost denials were
common in such cases, particularly in cases won by individual plaintiffs against
individual defendants, in which litigation costs were denied 43.8 percent of the
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time. This pattern is sensitive to inclusion of cases from Nazareth, but this is in
part because Property cases were so prevalent in that district.
CONCLUSION
Israeli judges usually require losing parties to pay their adversaries’ litigation
costs. The loser pays rule is most strictly applied to public corporations, which are
generally required to pay both parties’ litigation costs as losing plaintiffs and
losing defendants. When plaintiffs prevail on their claims in whole rather than in
part, they are much less likely to have their litigation costs denied, suggesting that
a party’s degree of success influences judicial decisions to award litigation costs.
Substantial pockets of departure from the loser pays norm exist, however. The
norm is asymmetrically applied in Tort cases, in which prevailing plaintiffs
almost always receive litigation costs while prevailing defendants receive them
only little more than half the time. It is also the exception, rather than the rule, in
Property cases in Nazareth.
The Israeli litigation cost award pattern is thus consistent with the qualitative descriptions of loser pays systems that led Reimann to reject the American
rule–British rule dichotomy. The loser pays jurisdictions described by Reimann
were so riddled with exceptions and limitations on amounts awarded as to
suggest that no large group of jurisdictions regularly awards winners litigation
costs more than Israeli judges do—regardless of what litigation cost rule these
jurisdictions outwardly claim to apply. Further confirmation of Israel’s consistency with less judge-centered systems requires more systematic information from
loser pays jurisdictions. The variety of litigation cost subsystems that Israeli judges seem to implement is also an interesting judicial complement to the variety of
litigation cost clauses that large corporations choose when they contract with one
another outside of court.105 The variety of litigation cost allocation methods that
exists in both judge-centered systems and in a private contractual setting suggests
that theorizing about optimal litigation cost rules should consider the rich variety
actual practice reveals.
This Article mainly described previously unstudied patterns of litigation cost
denials. Whatever the implications of our findings for the global debate about the
optimal litigation cost allocation system, our results should be of great interest for
practitioners. Israeli lawyers and clients now have systematic evidence about litigation cost denials in civil cases litigated to conclusion. This evidence should

105. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 5, at 352 tbl.2 (showing no attorney’s fee rule dominates in U.S.

public corporation contracts).
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inform their decisions about whether to accept cases, whether to file suit, and
about what kind of postfiling litigation behavior to engage in. For example,
lawyers in Nazareth Property cases may wish to inform their plaintiff clients about
the high probability of not recovering litigation costs even if they prevail.
Lawyers in Tort cases throughout Israel may wish to inform their clients about
the asymmetric treatment of litigation cost denials in such cases. Our descriptive
data also support at least one normative observation. It has been argued that a fair
and efficient litigation cost system requires asymmetry with express consideration
given to the relative wealth of the litigants.106 When Israeli judges departed from
the default loser pays treatment, they usually did so in a way that is consistent
with this aspiration.

106. See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 1, at 717 (proposing a “progressive one-way fee-shifting rule as a means of

equalizing justice in civil litigation and assisting people of modest means in financing litigation
against wealthy adversaries”).

